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Abstract: EU- Africa Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are on the brink. In 
July 2014 the Head of States of ECOWAS endorsed the negotiated compromise EPA 
after prolonged negotiations. However, last-minute objections of the heavy-weight 
Nigeria which wants to protect its infant industries as well as promising trade relations 
with new global players still could  prevent the deal. Whether the ECOWAS EPA in its 
current form would really create a win-win situation for both partners as asserted by the 
EU is open to question. Scholarly evaluation of the EPAs reveal double-talk and 
significant barriers to a sustainable development of African economies. The growing 
preparedness of African states to challenge EU mercantile interest has been effectively 
backed by agitation of civil society organisations. 
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Introduction 
In view of the global run on African resources and the quest for promising new African 
markets the EU is at pains to conclude Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with 
African states. Negotiations within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, a cornerstone 
of ACP-EU Development Cooperation, drag on since 2002. The EPAs are meant not just to 
liberalize trade but also to promote economic growth in Africa. Officially, they aim at creating 
a win-win situation in a partnership of equals, i.e. development orientation, promotion of 
inclusive growth and regional integration with due attention to WTO compatible regulations. 
According to the EU ‘Roadmap 2014 to 2017’ (EU 2014) all this would be realized by 
exemplary EPAs until 2017. The major issues at stake have been especially pronounced in 
the ongoing negotiations on West African EPAs. Contentious issues were legions, including 
time frames for liberalization, rules of origin, most favoured nations (MFN) clause, export 
taxes, trade distorting domestic and export subsidies, quantitative restrictions, development 
of benchmarks, indicators and targets for monitoring the implementation of the agreements 
and non-execution clause (ACP 2014:1). Many Africans suspect the EU of double talk and of 
promoting selfish export interest at the expense of inclusive growth in African countries. The 
authors of a recent study commissioned by the European Parliament acknowledge that 
                                                             
1
 The author acknowledges valuable comments of an anonymous reviewer.  
2 
 
several alternatives to the EPAs have been proposed already which could be WTO-
compatible and which the EU already provides to some other countries (EP 2014: i, 6)2. 
The ongoing controversy on EPAs with the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)i will serve as example to highlight and summarize in the light of recent 
developments the issues at stake, giving prominence to the critical scholarly standpoint of  
the avant-garde of new trade policy economics. 
Long-lasting trade negotiations between the EU and West African countries on ECOWAS 
(EPAs) are on the brink. The EU plays a policy of stick and carrots. Brussels threatens to 
cancel the project if its imposed dead-line of 1 October 2014 will not be honoured. Otherwise 
the unilateral trade preferences enjoyed by Europe’s former African colonies would be 
cancelled and the less favourable Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) regulations re-
imposed. The EU invokes the World Trade Organization (WTO) which urged to replace 
preferential trade deals with their former colonies, i.e. African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries. But evidently not all controversial provisions of the EPA were linked to WTO 
demands, like the most favoured nation clause and trade related intellectual property 
sections, stipulated unilaterally by the EU to the detriment of global trade perspectives of its 
African partners. On the other hand the EU conceded seemingly attractive regulations of 
market entry and extensive adjustment packages to the tune of € 6.5 bn at the end of 
prolonged EPA-negotiations (EC 2014). However, this would not necessarily be new money 
granted specifically for EPA related adjustments. 
 
In February 2014 the contracting parties came short with concluding a deal, negotiated after 
long lasting delaying resistance of the African partners. However, Nigeria upheld last-minute 
objections. Finally, on 10 July 2014 the Head of States of ECOWAS endorsed the negotiated 
compromise EPA after prolonged negotiations at its 45. ordinary session in Accra. Shortly 
afterwards (22 July) the signing of the SADC-EPA of the Southern African region followed 
suite, initialing the second African EPA within one month. Whether the treaties will be also 
ratified by lingering states like Nigeria, which is by far the largest economy in Africa, remains 
to be seen. Notably West Africa still risks having its regional integration efforts jeopardized in 
view of competing Anglophone and Francophone blocks within ECOWAs and conflicting 
interest of least developed countries (LDCs) and non LDCs. Upcoming controversial 
presidential elections in Nigeria in February 14, 2015 make an approval of Nigeria’s 
parliament unlikely. Internal resistance of business and civil society to EPAs in their present 
form is mounting, which threatens the likelihood of re-election of the president whose position 
has been weakened already under the threat of the growing terrorism of Boko Haram.  
 
ECOWAS-EPAs 
The heterogeneity of ECOWAS with corresponding conflicting interests contributed to the 
difficulties. Different national political elites adopted different approaches in the EPA 
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negotiation process over time. Nigeria, Africa’s Number one, is by far the biggest ECOWAS 
member, with more than half of the population and with a GDP of US $ 510bn (according to 
the overdue statistical readjustment in April 2014) more than two-thirds of regional aggregate 
GDP. Therefore, two decades ago, the Francophone West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU/UEMOA) was created in 2000 within the ECOWAS to counterbalance the 
heavyweight of Anglophone Nigeria and Ghana, last but not least to uphold the political and 
economic influence of France in its former colonies (Kohnert 2005). So called transit 
economies of small costal countries like Togo and Benin, heavily dependent on re-export 
trade and smuggling to bordering Nigeria do not necessarily share the same trade interest 
like their neighbours. Resource rich Nigeria that tries to protect its nascent industry by 
protectionist trade policy (Rommel 2012:22), again has other priorities than poor  land locked 
countries Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Per capita GDP (PPP) in the region ranges from 
US$396 (Liberia) to US$3,650 (Cape Verde), etc. In addition, the divide between LDCs and 
non-LDCs within ECOWAS is growing. A differentiated EU trade policy for poor and middle 
income countries contributed to the growing rift. Ghana and Ivory Coast, two non-LDCs, 
made it clear already that it is not necessary in their interest to harmonise the view of all 
ECOWAS members. As for Nigeria, it by now exports most of its products (notably crude oil 
& gas) duty free to Europe. Its EU exports became less important anyway in view of 
mounting exports to India and China. The same holds for cotton exports of Benin and Togo.  
All in all, ECOWAS countries are more vulnerable and dependent on external – 
predominantly European - trading partners than the EU. Just an estimated 10 to 15 per cent 
of registered aggregate ECOWAS trade is intra-regional and in addition it is dominated by 
Nigeria and Ghana. However, for smaller member countries like Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Senegal and Togo, regional trade is more important with respectively 36, 55, 46 and 59 per 
cent (Uexkull 2012:2-3).  
Certainly, 11 out of 15 ECOWAS countries, i.e. all its Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 
enjoy already full market access to the EU under the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative 
since 2001ii. The latter grants LDCs free access to European markets without being forced to 
open their own markets to EU imports. Therefore, these LDCs might think that they have little 
to lose if the EPAs would fail. The EU, however, made it clear that EBA is a unilateral 
arrangement granted by the EU which may be opened to LDCs outside the ACPiii This, so it 
was said, could create fierce competition for major export products of West African countries 
on their hitherto protected EU markets, like cocoa, coffee, sugar, and bananas (Bilal 2014)iv.  
What could cause additional headache is that LDCs which are currently enjoying EBA 
benefits, would lose these advantages under the regime of an ECOWAS customs union (to 
be introduced in January 2015) if member countries like Ghana or Ivory Coast should opt for 
bilateral EPAs.. The projected customs union would replace the imperfect trade liberalisation 
process within West Africa under the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS). Up to 
now, there is anything but free trade within ECOWAS. The envisaged custom union 
combined with bilateral EPAs could, at least theoretically, result in free access of EU exports 
to the whole region(Rommel 2012:17,23). First, because individual countries could not 
decide independently on the common external trade policy of the customs union and second, 
because rigid border controls are unrealistic in view of predominant informal transnational 
trade in West Africa. All in all, the EU says, the LDCs would be well advised to sign the EPAs 
which would not only regulate trade in goods but also that in services and investment. Thus, 
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it would enhance prospects for economic growth in the region in creating competitive 
advantage vis à vis other emerging economies.  
This EU induced EBA / EPA conundrum erodes the coherence of ECOWAS members and 
threatens regional integration further (Bilal 2007:204). It thus counteracts decades of EU aid 
policy meant to promote regional integration in Africa. However, one could reasonably argue 
that ironically the long lasting consultations had had also positive effects. But more often than 
not these positive results were not intended and took effect rather indirectly, e.g. in improving 
negotiation capacity of West Africa governments and even more of Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs), enhancing awareness on issues of free trade and development, and 
in introducing a common agricultural policy (ECOWAP) as well as a common external tariff 
(CET) (Olawale 2009). The decision of ECOWAS in October 2013 to introduce a customs 
union by January 2015 could be interpreted as an outcome of these effects. It demonstrated 
after decades of haggling a new political solidarity of ECOWAS leaders despite persistent 
fears of the continuing dominance of Nigeria. 
 
Political vs. scholarly assessment of EPAs 
The negotiated ECOWAS-EPA compromise would guarantee African member states quota-
free access to the EU market whereas the EU receives in return access to 75 per cent of a 
promising market of some 300 m consumers during a transitional period of 20 years. 
Brussels incessantly underlines that the EPA would create a win-win situation, although its 
African partners would gain most by signing the agreement, not least because of the 
accompanying development package. The adjustment assistance of € 6.5 bn is meant to 
compensate for losses in tariff revenues and to co-finance infrastructure investments of the 
16 member countries in the next five years. However, the question of tariffs becomes 
increasingly subordinated to contests about non-tariff measures and how they are 
implemented. Concerning EU exports to West Africa for example, the removal of 
supplementary levies and the issue of import licences and import bans was a major 
contested issue where the EU demands were well beyond WTO requirements. 
The fourth EU-Africa summit in Brussels in April 2014 nevertheless largely shunned the 
subject. However, negotiations probably continued behind closed doors. But this again points 
to a fundamental flaw in the EPA negotiation process the lack of rights of co-determination 
and of democratic agency of all stakeholders involved. Agenda setting by Brussels left it with 
full-bodied declarations on partnership of equals, development orientation, promotion of 
inclusive growth and regional integration with due attention to WTO compatible regulations. 
According to the EU ‘Roadmap 2014 to 2017’ (EU 2014) all this would be realized by 
exemplary EPAs until 2017.  
However, double talk by the EU in this respect is well known (Kohnert 2008). This is not just 
the opinion of possibly biased opponents of the ‘diabolic EPA deal’ (Kunateh 2014) like the 
Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) and of African CSOs. Recent scholarly analyses of the 
subject reveal remarkable congruence in the following points: 
  
(1) EU assistance for regional integration in Africa displays startling dissonance between 
declared development orientation on the one hand and selfish export interest of EU 
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member states on the other. Apparently, discrepancies exist not only between 
pretence and practice of EU aid (including the ‘Aid for Trade’ agenda) but also 
between divergent discourses of opposed directorates, namely DG Trade vs. DG 
development, as well as underlying conflicting interests of EU member states (Holden 
2014; Langan 2014; Young & Peterson 2013).  
 
(2) There is an increasingly effective disposition of African states to challenge the EU in a 
prolonged discourse on the basis of normative negotiation strategies. Empowered by 
a globalised world and international social networking, African governments take 
Brussels at its words, i.e. to deliver on its promises concerning development 
orientation and partnership of equals (Hurt et al 2013; Langan 2014).   
 
(3) Painstaking case studies of civil society agency in West Africa show how and why 
CSOs gained unpredicted influence on the implementation of inclusive, sustainable 
and participatory trade politics. These analyses provide a welcome corrective to 
conventional wisdom disregarding grass-root movements as locally restricted and 
irrelevant. On the contrary they even influenced the trade agenda of transnational 
power elites significantly (Trommer 2014). 
 
(4) Apparently the EU and other major actors of the Post-Washington consensus did not 
honour sufficiently lessons learned of failed neo-liberal structural adjustment reforms 
of the 1980s and 1990s in Africa. For example, budget aid, meant to promote 
inclusive growth according to OECD guidelines for ‘country ownership’, was used 
against official promises to force intractable African states into liberalisation programs 
of the second generation. Case studies from Tunisia, Ghana and Uganda 
demonstrate that EU budget aid was used strategically to enforce liberalisation 
demands on the expense of the poor and premature trade opening (Langan 2014a). 
 
(5) Potential gains of reciprocal elimination of tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers could not 
compensate welfare losses in view of enduring low African labour productivity. 
Resulting negative terms of trade effects for African economies would eat up most of 
the potential gains of liberalised trade. Short and medium term aid packages included 
in the EPAs in order to counteract these losses fall short of the mark. West Africa’s 
gains from tariff elimination would mainly come (if at all) from long-term endowment 
effects and improved resource allocation (Rakotoariso et al 2014).  
 
(6) The reform of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), a cornerstone of EU 
trade and development strategy, which is aimed officially to refocus assistance to the 
‘neediest’ countries, apparently serves in practice foremost to give leeway for free-
trade negotiations on a global scale. The developmental trade agenda of the EU and 
major members states is increasingly subordinated to commercial imperatives (Siles-
Brügge, 2014).  
 
(7) Current EU-US negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) will have unprecedented but hitherto neglected ramifications on EU-African 
trade relations. The same applies to the recent renewal of the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) between the US and Sub-Saharan economies. Africa, which 
currently takes just two per cent of global trade, urgently requires better access to 
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markets on a global scale and not just to EU markets. West African states that share 
Atlantic seaways with the EU and the United States as well as the problematic legacy 
of economic and political relationship with its former colonial masters will be 
especially affected. ECOWAS will lose ground by the TTIP agreements if it does not 
become involved and oppose possible negative effects pro-actively (Mutamba 2014).    
 
Conclusion: 
In view of the global run on African resources and the quest for promising new African 
markets the EU is at pains to conclude Economic Partnership Programs (EPAs) with African 
states. Officially EPAs claim creating a win-win situation in a partnership of equals. However, 
many Africans suspect the EU of double talk and of promoting selfish export interest at the 
expense of inclusive growth in African countries. Taking the proposed ECOWAS EPAs as an 
example, analyses reveal surprising contradictions on multiple levels. First, apparent political 
tensions in the long-lasting negotiation process are due to a significant disparity between 
discourse and practice of EU trade and aid policy. Second, this divergence has been 
reinforced by diverging and often hidden interest between EU directorates (DG trade vs. DG 
development) and underlying self-centred mercantile and political concerns of individual EU 
member states. Third, the growing preparedness of African governments to challenge the EU 
on trade and development issues is not only due to African power elites trying to consolidate 
its economic base. To a significant extend their delaying resistance against unfair EPAs has 
been provoked by long lasting proactive agitation of civic organisations and NGOs inside and 
outside of Africa.  
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 Including the 15 ECOWAS members, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
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2000 to join the Arab Maghreb Union. 
ii
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granted unilaterally by the EU to developing countries committed to good governance and respect of human 
rights, while Nigeria fell back to less favourable EU market access under the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) (Uexkull 2012:2). 
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iii
 As stated by the EU-Delegation to Sierra Leone in its online contribution: The EU - ECOWAS Economic 
Partnership Agreement, accessed: 18 June 2014.  
iv
 These statements are difficult to follow literally because one of the major aims of EBA from the outset was to extend 
preferences that were granted until 2000 to ACP states only, to all LDCs, i.e. currently 49 LDCs worldwide. An aim which was 
fulfilled already after a transitional period for the most sensitive sectors, bananas, rice and sugar in 2009 (Young & Peterson 
2013:506). What was probably meant by the EU was to extend these preferences not only to all LDCs but also to ‘lower-middle 
income economies’, like Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Cape Verde, but possibly also Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras and Indonesia. At 
least a statement of the European Commission (EC) points in this direction, namely that as of 1 January 2014 a new GSP would 
apply in the EU, strengthening the EBA by “focussing preferences on those that need them most (lower-income economies and 
LDCs), the new GSP will have fewer beneficiaries. This will reduce competitive pressure on LDCs and make the preferences for 
LDCs more meaningful—providing much more opportunity to export”. (EC 2014: Everything But Arms (EBA) – Who benefits?, 
online, accessed: 18 June 2014).  
